Category: Interviews

Angeloni: «La lotta all’inflazione è una sfida che si può vincere»

Il Messaggero – Intervista con Rosario Dimito

Il Messaggero >>


Come valuta il calo dell’inflazione al 6,4%?
«E’ una buona notizia, che conferma la tendenza dei mesi precedenti. Conforta anche l’ultimo dato dell’inflazione Usa, già sotto il 3%. Questi dati dimostrano che l’inflazione che abbiamo vissuto nell’ultimo biennio non è invincibile. La sua “persistenza” (cioè la resistenza all’azione correttiva della banca centrale) è minore che in passato. La Bce dovrebbe quindi trovare in questo conferma della correttezza della linea da essa seguita nell’ultimo anno. Si tratta di continuare su quella linea, portando i tassi a breve in territorio moderatamente positivo al netto dell’inflazione. E al tempo stesso riducendo la liquidità in eccesso che si è accumulata sul mercato. Il tutto con gradualità e cautela, a mano a mano che si va avanti e ci si porta vicino all’obiettivo». 


A cosa è dovuta questa discesa?
«I prezzi energetici sono calati vistosamente negli ultimi mesi, sia indirettamente per l’azione monetaria delle banche centrali, sia più direttamente perché i mercati a livello globale si sono aggiustati più rapidamente di quanto molti avevano previsto alla crisi geopolitica e alle sanzioni imposte alla Russia. Solo un anno fa temevamo la crisi energetica, si parlava di razionamento; oggi la maggiore offerta e la riduzione della domanda per effetto del risparmio spingono il mercato nella direzione opposta. Anche l’aumento dei prezzi alimentari sembra aver raggiunto un picco, pur rimanendo ancora alto. Rimane da portare sotto controllo la dinamica inflazionistica nel settore dei servizi. Anche lì, l’azione della politica monetaria è fondamentale».


Quale dovrà essere la reazione della Bce difronte al calo dei prezzi?
«Non mi sento di fare previsioni. In prospettiva, però, i tassi a breve devono tornare positivi in termini reali. Determinazione e cautela sono le parole chiave che dovrebbero guidare l’azione della Bce nei prossimi mesi». 
I rischi di una eventuale fiammata dei prezzi a cosa potrebbe essere legata, alle tensioni in Ucraina sul grano?
«Non si può mai escludere a priori, ma personalmente sono incoraggiato dalla facilità con cui i mercati dell’energia hanno trovato un equilibrio dopo lo shock iniziale della guerra in Uctraina e delle sanzioni». 


Ci sono fenomeni speculativi dietro l’aumento dei prezzi registrati in questi mesi?
«Eviterei la tentazione di prendersela con gli speculatori, come a volte si fa in Italia e anche altrove quando i prezzi aumentano. Con l‘inflazione diventa più difficile comprendere i prezzi, capire cioè se quello che paghiamo è giusto oppure chi ci vende le cose se ne sta approfittando. Nell’incertezza, può anche accadere che coloro che fissano i prezzi si “portino avanti”, aumentando magari un po’ di più di quanto sarebbe giustificato dai costi che sopportano. Anche questo fenomeno genera persistenza. L’azione della politica monetaria e la concorrenza di mercato sono gli strumenti per evitare che questi effetti prendano piede e si perpetuino».


A fine anno l’inflazione a che livello potrà arrivare?
«Lo scorso anno, quando ancora c’era chi pensava che l’inflazione fosse temporanea e che in breve si sarebbe esaurita senza far nulla, prevedetti che essa sarebbe durata fino al 2024. In assenza di nuovi eventi negativi e imprevisti, penso che quella previsione sia ancora valida. Per considerare l’obiettivo raggiunto sarebbe sufficiente, a mio avviso, che l’inflazione si portasse stabilmente in prossimità del 2%, senza accanirsi sui singoli decimali». 


Il calo dell’inflazione che impatto avrà sulle fasce più deboli?
«Sono state già ampiamente colpite, quindi è giusto e fisiologico che ci sia un recupero da parte dei salari soprattutto nelle fasce più basse».

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Digitaler Euro: Ehemaliger EZB-Direktor zweifelt

WirtschaftsWoche –
Interview von Silke Wettach

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Am Mittwoch stellt die EU-Kommission die Gesetzesgrundlage für digitales Notenbankgeld in der Eurozone vor. Der frühere EZB-Direktor Ignazio Angeloni zweifelt am ökonomischen Nutzen des Projekts.

WirtschaftsWoche: Herr Angeloni, warum beschäftigen sich so viele Notenbanken rund um den Globus mit digitalen Währungen?
Ignazio Angeloni: Das hat vor drei, vier Jahren angefangen, als Facebook seine Kryptowährung Libra ankündigte und Bitcoin sehr stark war. Mittlerweile hat sich eine Eigendynamik entwickelt. Den Verantwortlichen fällt es schwer, das Thema wieder ad acta zu legen.

Das klingt so, als ob Notenbanker von Angst um ihren Einfluss hätten. Stimmt dieser Eindruck?
Wir haben etwas erlebt, dass die Amerikaner „fear of missing out“ (Fomo) nennen – die Angst nicht dabei zu sein und als technologisch rückständig zu gelten. Dabei ist es wichtig, zwei Punkte im Blick zu behalten. Erstens besteht aus Verbrauchersicht kein notwendiger Bedarf für digitales Notenbankgeld. Es gibt nichts, was man damit machen könnte, was sich heute nicht schon effizient und sicher mit den vorhandenen Instrumenten erledigen lässt. Wir haben also keinen Fall von Marktversagen, der einen Eingriff der Politik rechtfertigen würde.

Und der zweite Punkt?
Leute wie Sie und ich könnten mit dem digitalen Euro zum ersten Mal Geld bei der Notenbank einlegen und nicht mehr nur bei einer Geschäftsbank. Das ändert den Transmissionsriemen der Geldpolitik und hat Auswirkungen auf die Finanzstabilität. Die Geschäftsbanken verlieren Einlagen, wenn die Leute ihre Guthaben in den digitalen Euro umwandeln. Den Geschäftsbanken könnten damit schätzungsweise bis zu zehn Prozent der Einlagen abhandenkommen. Der digitale Euro könnte auch die Gefahr für Bank-Runs verstärken, weil Bankkunden ihr Geld per Mausklick in Notenbankgeld umwandeln können.

Das Haltelimit für den digitalen Euro soll auf 3000 Euro beschränkt werden, um die Finanzstabilität sicherzustellen. Reicht das aus?
Ohne Limit würde der Stabilitätsaspekt noch viel stärker ins Gewicht fallen. 3000 Euro sind aber ein willkürlich gewählter Wert. Der Betrag sollte nicht zu hoch sein und nicht zu niedrig. Aber wo ist die Mitte? Wie will man das genau festlegen? Diese Punkte sind bislang offen.

Täuscht der Eindruck, dass die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) den digitalen Euro mit besonders viel Vehemenz vorantreibt? Mehr als etwa die Bank of England oder die Fed in den USA?
Die US-Zentralbanker scheinen unentschlossen zu sein. Ein gewisser Druck könnte von der Regierung von Joe Biden ausgehen. Aber ich vertraue darauf, dass die dortigen Ökonomen diese Frage mit Bedacht angehen werden. Ich erwarte auch von der Bank of England, dass sie vorausschauend denkt und handelt.

Und in der Euro-Zone?
Die EZB und die EU-Kommission, vielleicht auch einige europäische Regierungen, scheinen sich eher für eine digitale Währung zu erwärmen. Sowohl EZB-Präsidentin Christine Lagarde als auch die EU-Kommission argumentieren, dass der digitale Euro die strategische Autonomie der EU stärke.

Spielt Geopolitik also eine größere Rolle als ökonomische Argumente?
Mich erinnert das an die Debatte über nationale Fluggesellschaften. Vor vielen Jahren schien es unerlässlich, dass jedes Land in Europa seine eigene nationale Fluggesellschaft hat. Das lief unter dem Stichwort strategische Autonomie. Inzwischen hat Lufthansa Anteile an Brussels Airlines, Swiss, Austrian Airlines und neuerdings auch an der italienischen Fluggesellschaft ITA erworben. Niemand scheint sich mehr um die strategische Autonomie im Luftfahrtsektor zu sorgen. Das Argument ist also kaum überzeugend.

China treibt seine digitale Währung mit Nachdruck voran. Geopolitik-Analysten sehen die Gefahr, dass chinesische Unternehmen europäische Geschäftspartner zwingen könnten, mit eYuan zu bezahlen. Ein realistisches Szenario?
Der Wettbewerb zwischen dem Dollar, dem Euro und dem Yuan hängt von vielem ab, aber nicht von der Existenz eines digitalen Zentralbankgeldes. Der eYuan ist ein öffentliches Projekt und jeder weiß, dass der chinesische Staat und die Kommunistische Partei damit auch Kontrolle ausüben wollen. Sicherheitsfragen spielen in den internationalen Beziehungen eine immer größere Rolle. Europäische Unternehmen werden also möglicherweise zögern, sich auf den eYuan einzulassen.

Die EU-Kommission macht sich auch deshalb für den digitalen Euro stark, weil die EU bisher stark von Zahlungsdienstleistern aus Drittländern wie den USA abhängig ist. Was ist da dran?
Wer glaubt, dass der digitale Euro die US-Kreditkartennetze und Smartphone-Anwendungen ersetzen wird, hat Pech gehabt. Der Blick auf Marktanteile und Trends deutet darauf hin, dass dies nicht der Fall sein wird.

Was passiert, wenn der digitale Euro zum Flop würde? Wenn er eingeführt wird und niemand ihn haben will?
In diesem Fall würde der Status quo weiterbestehen, was für das Zahlungssystem der Eurozone nicht schlecht wäre. Dagegen könnte die Vorbereitung auf einen digitalen Euro Vorteile haben. Wir hätten dann ein System, das bei Bedarf hochgefahren werden könnte. Ich sehe den digitalen Euro als Vorsichtsmaßnahme für den Fall eines fatalen Systemzusammenbruchs oder anderer widriger Umstände.

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Credit market developments may limit ECB actions on interest rates

OMFIF – Ignazio Angeloni in conversation with David Marsh


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Some of the risks of the 2008-12 period could resurface

Ignazio Angeloni, a former member of the European Central Bank’s supervisory board, is one of Europe’s most seasoned central bankers, with ample experience of covering twin responsibilities in monetary and financial stability. This is an edited extract of Angeloni’s conversation with David Marsh, OMFIF chairman, at the DZ BANK-OMFIF capital market conference in Frankfurt.

Angeloni thinks that the ECB should not have relaunched expansionary policies just before the Covid-19 outbreak and should not have prolonged quantitative easing for so long in 2021 and in the first half of 2022. But he says: ‘These bygones are not very important from today’s perspective. The interest stance the ECB has taken since last July is correct.’

Given worries about financial stability, Angeloni cautions the ECB to go carefully with further interest rate increases – echoing comments by Ignazio Visco, governor of Banca d’Italia. Angeloni said: ‘To the extent that banks tighten credit, slower or lower ECB tightening action may be needed as we move on.’ In view of a likely period of low growth and relatively high inflation, Angeloni warns: ‘Some of the risks of the 2008-12 period could resurface’.

‘The banks face two unhappy alternatives’

David Marsh: There have been squalls with banks in both the US and Europe in the last two months, partly reflecting the difficulties of coping with higher interest rates. We remember the early years of the 2000s, when supervisory and regulators allowed too much risk to build up in the banking system. How close are we to a return of these difficulties of 2007-09 – in both Europe and the US?

Ignazio Angeloni: There are both commonalities and differences between the US and Europe, as far as banks are concerned. The main commonality is that banks reacted to the lower-for-long period of interest rates in a similar (and predictable) way by increasing exposures to long-dated bonds, and also increasing mortgage exposures, mainly at fixed rates but also at floating rates.

DM: What are the effects as interest rates rise?

IA: The banks face two unhappy alternatives. They either hold on to their assets and haemorrhage gradually through their profit and loss accounts. Or they sell the assets and face losses all at once. To the extent that mortgages were arranged at floating rates, the losses fall on households, with a possible strong contractionary effect on consumption.

DM: What about deposit movements?

IA: That’s another commonality. Evidence is mounting that the velocity of deposit runs has increased in the US as a result of digital banking and the concentration of deposits. We still lack good analyses of this phenomenon for Europe. The speed of deposit movements may have increased here as well.

‘The US relaxed its post-crisis regulatory stance too much during the Donald Trump administration’

DM: What are the main differences?

IA: These lie in the regulatory stance. The US relaxed its post-crisis regulatory stance too much during the Donald Trump administration. The US’s strength lies in a functioning crisis management framework, centred on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The euro area has had a better supervisory stance but its weakness is in the incompleteness of the banking union and especially in the lack of a credible crisis management framework.

DM: How close are we to repeating the events of 2008?

IA: I am concerned because we do not have a good picture yet. The interest rate rises and the transmission of their effects are still playing out and could still present surprises. Hopefully, the single supervisory mechanism has good information, especially on bank exposures and related risks. In any case, the ECB from now on will have to manage the situation very cautiously and gradually.

‘The last pre-pandemic expansionary step was unnecessary’

DM: What do you think of the view of Jacques de Larosière that central banks themselves are to blame for this state of affairs through their insufficient grasp of the earlier problem of higher inflation?

IA: De Larosière’s remarks are true, but not very useful in dealing with the situation. The LFL phase is to a large extent at the root of our present problems. Had the inflation risk been spotted earlier, the interest rate rise could have been more gradual, giving the system more time to adapt.

DM: Where have mistakes been made?

IA: The last pre-pandemic expansionary step – the ECB’s decision to restart quantitative easing in September 2019 – was unnecessary. And the tightening cycle should have come in the second half of 2021, rather than in 2022. But we are where we are: we need to face the situation as it is now. These bygones are not very important from today’s perspective. The interest stance the ECB has taken since last July is correct.’

‘The ECB has moved well, but now may come the difficult part’

DM: What should happen next? Does the ECB decision on 4 May to raise interest rates by a relatively moderate 0.25 points and stop all asset purchase programme reinvestments from 1 July go far enough?

IA: After some initial hesitation, the ECB has moved well, but now may come the difficult part: understanding how the transmission through banks is playing out. The interest rate stance is still expansionary, as measured by the short-term interest rates net of short-term inflation. But the impact on banks is a big unknown.

DM: You have suggested a means of drawing liquidity through reverse targeted long-term refinancing operations.

IA: Yes, a new reverse long-term operation providing commercial banks with the rights to swap central bank deposits for long-term securities, allowing a gradual lowering of the deposit rate. Bank liquidity buffers are declining already, but a repurchase instrument would accelerate the process and make it more flexible.

DM: How close are we to seeing action to improve matters?

IA: The ECB has three levers to move: interest rate increases, quantitative tightening and liquidity absorption, and action on the deposit rate. To the extent that banks tighten credit, slower or lower ECB tightening action will be needed.

‘Operating two sets of policies is not a choice, but an obligation’

DM: Are worries over financial stability likely to prevent central banks from taking tough measures to reduce inflation? There are surely trade-offs – whatever the official doctrine of the ECB? Can central banks operate two sets of policies at once to safeguard both monetary and financial stability?

IA: The ECB has been, since 2014, responsible for both price stability and financial stability. So operating two sets of policies is not a choice, but an obligation. The question is: are the instruments for these policies separate or to some extent related? My short answer is that these instruments must stay separate in calm times but need to come together and reinforce each other in a crisis.

DM: Are there lessons you can draw from the UK’s autumn 2022 fiscal-monetary episode over the Liz Truss – Kwasi Kwarteng budget?

IA: The main lesson from the UK episode is that governments can help the action of central banks, or they can hinder it.

DM: What implications does this have for the transmission protection instrument – where you have famously called for a ‘user manual’? There isn’t one yet!

IA: In the euro area, governments can help by reducing the probability of ‘doom loops’ between government finances and bank instability. Concretely this requires keeping government finances under control and ensuring that banks are sound. The main problem in the euro area is the imperfect banking union. But member states also have work to do: strengthen their banks and reinforce the parts of the banking frameworks for which national authorities are responsible.

‘The distinction in the EU treaty between bond purchases at issue and on the secondary market is a tenuous one’

DM: The European treaties say that the ECB must not get into the business of financing governments. How do you react to criticism that QE protects governments from the discipline of sound fiscal policies? There has been an arithmetical correlation in recent years between net issuance by euro area government and net ECB bond purchases. Is this another reason why did the ECB’s QE went on for too long? 

IA: Indeed, the distinction in the EU treaty between bond purchases at issue and on the secondary market is a tenuous one. Especially when purchases are massive and long-lasting, as they have been, buying on the secondary market helps the primary market as well, because auction participants know that they will be able to re-sell the bonds they purchase at issue, so they are encouraged to buy.

DM: Can this problem be avoided?

IA: Any central bank must intervene in bond markets. They have to be independent in doing so. Ultimately it is up to them and their judgement.

‘It will be difficult to bring inflation back to 2% on a stable basis’

DM: Given central banks’ difficulties controlling inflation, particularly after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, it seems likely to me that inflation in the euro area will settle in the area of 3% to 4% for some years because it will be highly difficult (and painful) to get it down to 2%. That need not be a tragedy. It will help to reduce the debt burden for the most indebted nations. So how likely is this scenario?

IA: I agree that in the euro area it will be difficult to bring inflation back to 2% on a stable basis. Most factors that facilitated that outcome in the years of the ‘great moderation’ are now gone. Economists were debating then whether that outcome was the result of ‘good policies’ or ‘good luck’. Now we know that it was the second.

DM: So what does the future hold?

IA: My main concern is that the euro area may be entering a phase of stagflation, owing to a combination of three factors. Private expenditure is stalling as a result of uncertainty and risk aversion. Public expenditure is not sufficiently supportive because of an inability to implement the recovery and resilience investment plans in full under the Next Generation EU programme. And monetary policy is stuck in a bad equilibrium with high inflation.

DM: What is your conclusion?

IA: In that scenario, some of the risks of the 2008-12 period could resurface.

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