25 anni di Bce: promossa o bocciata?
Class CNBC
Author: Ignazio Angeloni
Dopo le crisi bancarie USA, la riforma che serve in Italia
Il Sole 24 Ore
La situazione delle banche continua a destare preoccupazione da entrambi i lati dell’Atlantico. L’autorità Usa di gestione delle crisi (Federal deposit insurance corporation, Fdic) ha proposto di aumentare la copertura dell’assicurazione dei depositi, che è già più estesa di quella europea e al contrario della nostra è sostenuta dal bilancio federale. Nel dibattito europeo stanno prendendo piede due idee, entrambe sbagliate. La prima è che il problema non ci riguardi, perché la vigilanza Bce è migliore di quella americana. Lo è, ma non basta. La seconda, accarezzata specialmente in Italia, è che il problema sia la Banca centrale, che aumenta i tassi di interesse. Queste idee spostano l’attenzione da quello che dovrebbe essere l’obiettivo principale: rafforzare i presidi di stabilità del sistema.
Quanto sta accadendo alle banche è una manifestazione fisiologica, ma esasperata, di quanto avviene in qualunque ciclo monetario. Esasperata perché mai in passato si erano visti tassi di interesse a zero, e addirittura negativi, per giunta così a lungo. Quando i tassi scendono le banche sono inondate di depositi; in parte si tengono liquide, in parte investono in titoli a reddito fisso e mutui immobiliari. Nel far questo prendono rischio. Quando i tassi ritornano normali, le banche sono intrappolate da due parti. Da un lato i depositi escono, quindi parte dell’attivo va smobilizzato con possibili perdite in conto capitale. Dall’altro, il costo del finanziamento aumenta, mentre il rendimento dell’attivo a tasso fisso resta basso. Perdite quindi anche dal lato del conto economico.
Questi esiti erano ampiamente prevedibili nel periodo della Grande Espansione Monetaria, dal 2008 al 2022. Forse qualche eccesso si poteva evitare; per esempio, l’ultima espansione pre-pandemica della Bce (settembre 2019) retrospettivamente appare inutile. E la Bce poteva capire prima che stava arrivando l’inflazione, anticipando e rendendo quindi meno brusco l’aumento dei tassi. Ma tant’è; la situazione oggi va affrontata come tale.
L’esperienza recente delle banche USA mostra che per proteggere la stabilità del sistema l’autorità preposta deve poter fare quattro cose:
1 prendere in carico la banca in crisi;
2 sollecitare offerte di acquirenti per tutta o parte di essa, mettendoli in concorrenza;
3 negoziare la suddivisione dei costi fra essi e l’autorità stessa;
4 scegliere la soluzione di minor costo.
Per far questo essa deve disporre di mezzi finanziari, provenienti in primo luogo da fondi interbancari e poi se necessario dai fondi pubblici salvo rivalersi poi sul sistema bancario. In Europa, il Meccanismo di risoluzione unico (Mru) non ha né le strutture, né i poteri, né i mezzi finanziari per affrontare e risolvere le crisi bancarie in questo modo. La legislazione gli assegna un potere decisionale sul quarto punto di cui sopra, ma senza i primi tre il meccanismo non può funzionare a dovere.
Va anche ricordato che in nessun caso la Fdic può assumere partecipazioni o rischi su banche in attività, se non nel quadro di un’operazione di risoluzione a seguito della quale la banca come
tale esce dal mercato.
La proposta di riforma della legislazione europea avanzata dalla Commissione europea il mese scorso non risolve nessuno di questi problemi. Permangono i vincoli che impediscono al Mru di agire autonomamente sui suddetti primi tre punti. Continuano a esserci ostacoli pressoché insormontabili all’uso del fondo europeo di risoluzione. A dispetto delle intenzioni, si ampliano di fatto gli spazi per gli “interventi preventivi” su banche in attività, a rischio di depauperare le già scarse risorse per l’assicurazione dei depositi e la risoluzione delle crisi.
L’unico spazio per progredire in questo momento è in ambito nazionale. A grandi tratti un’ipotesi di riforma potrebbe configurarsi come segue. L’ipotetica agenzia italiana per l’assicurazione dei depositi riunirebbe le funzioni di risoluzione nazionale e assicurazione dei depositi, al momento separate. Avrebbe una struttura indipendente, esterna alla Banca d’Italia. Disporrebbe di poteri di intervento, quali quelli sopra delineati, e mezzi finanziari adeguati, se necessario ricorrendo al sistema bancario. Avrebbe accesso al bilancio pubblico a precise e restrittive condizioni, salvo poi rivalersi sul sistema. Infine, non sarebbe autorizzata a intervenire a sostegno di banche in attività, salvo circostanze eccezionali e su richiesta delle autorità europee.
Niente nella legislazione europea impone una riforma del genere. Ma niente la proibisce. Sarebbe un atto di “sovranità italiana”. Un esempio anche per altri Paesi e un segnale rassicurante per depositanti
e mercati finanziari.
Riproduzione riservata ©
The digital euro: a precautionary device, not a deus-ex-machina
SUERF Policy Brief, No 588
There is much discussion today about a possible digital euro (PDE). Is this attention exaggerated? Are “central bank digital currencies” (CBDCs) “a solution in search of a problem”, as some have argued? This article summarizes the main facts about the PDE and concludes that, if the decision on adoption had to be taken today, the arguments against would outweigh those in favor. However, there may be future circumstances in which having a CBDC ready for use can indeed be useful. Therefore, preparing is a good thing, even if the odds of its usefulness in normal conditions are slim.
1. What purpose could a digital euro serve?
There is much talk today about a possible digital euro (PDE), while Europe – indeed, the whole world – is ridden by apparently more serious problems: inflation, war, climate change, health risks, and more. Is that attention exaggerated? Are “central bank digital currencies” (CBDCs) “a solution in search of a problem”, as some have argued?1 Perhaps we should see this from a different angle. CBDCs can be useful, indeed crucially important, not in spite of but precisely because there are those risks. The digital euro is not, as some contend, a sort of deus-ex-machina2 that will solve flaws of today’s payment system and shape its future, but a precautionary device for adverse circumstances. Our current market-based payment system does not need salvaging or reshaping because it fundamentally works, although, like everything else, could be improved. But it is fragile: the more so because it is becoming increasingly complex, digital, and online. Complexity enhances risk. Guarding against such risk is an area where CBDCs can really help.
In this article,3 I summarize the main facts about the PDE and argue that, if the decision on adoption had to be taken today, the arguments against would outweigh those in favor. Next to that, I note that there may be circumstances – admittedly unlikely and adverse ones, but not impossible – in which having a CBDC ready for use can indeed be useful. Therefore, preparing is a good thing, even if the odds of its usefulness in normal conditions are slim.
2. A substitute for bank deposits
One way to start is to observe that, in spite of its purported kinship with banknotes and coins, the introduction of a digital euro is actually likely to result mainly in a substitution away from traditional bank deposits, leaving the demand for cash essentially unchanged.
Multiple reasons lead to this conclusion.
Banknotes have unique characteristics – simplicity, absolute privacy, and – I dare say – tangibility as well – that are highly valued and that the digital euro will never have. Multiple survey analyses demonstrate that people value those characteristics highly. This is likely to be a key reason why cash, far from disappearing everywhere as some argue, is very popular everywhere in the world – with minor exceptions.4 A few data illustrate this. In the 21 years of their existence, euro banknotes have increased sevenfold in value, up to 1.6 tn. euros; this amounts to a compounded increase of about 10% per annum. The equivalent figure for the US dollar is 6.5%, for the British pound 5.2%, for the Swiss franc, 4.4%. Were we to judge by this metric alone, we would conclude not only that cash reigns everywhere, but also that the euro is the world’s most popular currency.
Some argue that the popularity of cash reflects growing illegal activities, but this is unlikely to explain most of the phenomenon. The increase of the euros in circulation during that period was very steady year by year; indicators of criminal activity do not have such a smooth profile. And the increase in euro coins shows more or less the same pattern. It is unlikely that criminals and tax evaders make extensive use of coins. A more relevant explanation is that people actually like to hold euro banknotes, in spite of the fact that for many retail purposes, cash is replaced by more convenient digital means – online platforms, payment cards, smartphone applications, and the like.
Another fact suggesting a high substitutability between digital euros and traditional bank deposits is that they would look very similar to one another. According to current ECB plans, PDE accounts will mainly be offered by banks (and to a lesser extent, by other payment service providers, PSPs). All front-end functions will be carried out by them. They will be responsible for onboarding and offboarding, KYC and AML checks, and as well as providing to users all services normally associated with deposits – online banking, payment cards, apps, etc. There will be strong synergies between opening a bank deposit and a digital euro deposit – same process, same information, same forms to fill. From a user perspective, there will be no difference between opening a PDE or a normal deposit at a bank.
The substitution between digital euros and bank deposits would probably be both structural and cyclical. The structural part would take place at the start, as the new instrument is introduced and asset holders make room for it. The cyclical component would be ongoing, as the demand for PDEs would move up and down as a result of economic factors, such as interest rate fluctuations or risk aversion cycles. Interest rate movements would be an obvious determinant since it is unlikely that any remuneration of the digital euro (administratively set) would move in sync with that of bank deposits (market-determined).
3. Monetary policy and financial stability issues
Reallocations between bank deposits and digital euro would affect both monetary policy and financial stability.
The effect on monetary policy derives from the fact that those movements impact the banking sector’s balance sheets, in particular its liquidity buffers. These movements would probably be negligible in comparison to the very large amount of bank liquidity outstanding today. But in the future, should the central bank return to a limited-reserves monetary control framework, they would be significant and could disturb monetary control.
The ECB monetary control framework today hinges on the rate of the ECB’s deposit facility. The ECB must move that rate in order to influence money market rates. If the remuneration on PDEs were to be set at a different level, probably a lower one, or even at zero, arbitrage opportunities would arise: banks could offer fixed-term deposit swaps to profit from that margin. The ECB may try to inhibit such operations, but as long as market pressure exists for the two rates to converge, complications would arise because the two rates are supposed to serve different objectives – one for monetary policy, and the other for payment system considerations.
Financial stability implications stem from the fact that the PDE would offer a completely risk-free online alternative to bank deposits, hence a natural channel to “run” on bank deposits when there are doubts about the bank’s solvency. Deposit insurance does not eliminate this risk entirely; the European banking union lacks area-wide insurance, and national schemes differ in their provisions, business practices, and balance sheets. Concern for bank runs has increased recently after the recent bank instability episodes in the United States, due to the fact that technological and structural factors seem to have increased the mobility of bank deposits.5
The ECB intends to set a limit to the maximum holding of PDE, perhaps at 3,000 euros. This puts a ceiling to the maximum aggregate outflow, at around 10% of overnight deposits. For individual banks, however, that percentage could be bigger, depending on the bank’s funding structure. The risk of a run is relevant for individual banks, not in the aggregate only. Once a bank is at risk, contagion effects may propagate the crisis to others.
There may be political complications as well. In case of a bank run, the ECB may come under pressure to relax the upper limit on PDE deposits. A banking crisis is a painful and politically sensitive event because it puts individual savings at risk. As banking supervisor, the ECB is responsible for financial stability. It is not required to bail out depositors in a crisis, but once PDE deposits existed, that idea may get political traction, and pressure on the ECB may result.
4. Can the digital euro be a catalyst for payment system innovation?
Some have argued that CBDCs will be an essential feature of tomorrow’s monetary systems, a sort of top-down catalyst of innovation and progress. For example, in an influential chapter of its 2022 annual report, the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements (BIS) argues that “… retail CBDCs constitute another core feature of the future monetary system”.6 The BIS envisages a prospect in which central banks could enhance their network of deposit accounts, today reserved mainly to credit institutions connected through centralized ledgers, in multiple directions: for example, adopting 24/7 instant payments, augmenting the range of financial and non-financial counterparties (including individual users), adopting distributed-ledger technologies (DLT) for certain purposes, and perhaps even adding facilities like programmable money and smart contracts. According to that vision, those developments represent a “canopy” that rests on a solid “trunk” of stability represented by the presence of central bank money at its base.
The stability-enhancing role of central bank money at the base of the payment system is unquestionable: in fact, this is precisely what happens in today’s arrangement, where all market-based digital facilities like cards, wallets, apps, and digital platforms eventually settle on central bank money. What is unclear in that vision, though, is why the “canopy” needs a CBDC to develop, thrive and innovate. If anything, recent experience demonstrates the opposite, namely that a diversified and efficient market-based digital payment system can develop and prosper in the absence of CBDCs. Inroads of the public sector in that territory by central banks directly managing retail CBDCs risks stifling innovation, not promoting it.
5. Issues arising when “marketing” the digital euro
Relatedly, a significant risk inherent in the project is how the PDE may be received by the market. Already today, European users have access to a multiplicity of different digital means, including powerful incumbents ones like ApplePay and GooglePay. Convincing them to use another one, which would also require opening an additional account at the bank, would be challenging. Rejection by the market is therefore a possible outcome. A failure to market the PDE successfully would have negative reputational and cost implications. Countries that have already launched a CBDC on an experimental basis, like China and the Bahamas, have not been very successful. The Bahamas launched the Sand Dollar in 2021; at end-2022, there were only 300,000 Sand Dollars in circulation, a negligible amount. China launched the e-Yuan in 2020, and in 2022, the transactions on it were negligible compared to its private sector competitors, Alipay and WeChat.
6. Conclusions: the digital euro as a precautionary device
The above arguments lead to the conclusion that, based on today’s information, the balance of the arguments does not favor the launch of a digital euro if that decision had to be made now. The risks and the imponderables of the enterprise are stronger than the arguments in favor of it.
However, in the future, there could be circumstances making the introduction of a digital euro useful, even necessary. It may be worthwhile to think in advance of examples where that may be.
We could witness, for example, an unexpected collapse in the availability of banknotes or sudden switches in consumer preferences towards payment instruments which current infrastructures cannot easily handle with the available technologies. Or we could experience phases of financial instability requiring the ECB to back up the private sector in order to preserve the functionality of the payment system. Or, there could be strategic security conditions necessitating more state-driven payment infrastructures. All these are unlikely scenarios, but not impossible ones, which would lead to the need for central banks to step in, perhaps in a short time.
A recent instance helps illustrate the point. In a little-known episode of the euro crisis, in June 2013 the UK government faced an urgent need to provide euro means of payment to its military personnel stationed in the Akrotiri air base on the southern shore of Cyprus. At that time, Cypriot banks were undergoing a banking crisis.7 While the crisis unfolded, there was a material risk of Cypriot banks being unable to provide the 3000-strong Royal Air Force personnel with means for their immediate payment needs. On 19 June, while an internationally-funded rescue deal was still being finalized, the UK Department of Defense arranged for a military plane loaded with 1 mn. euro banknotes to be shipped over.8 Absent a capability by the Central Bank of Cyprus, a member of the Eurosystem, to provide for central bank money through alternative means, shipping cash by air seemed to be the only remedy. Clearly, had a digital euro facility been available, that military flight would have been unnecessary. At the same time, the arguments discussed earlier make equally clear that the presence of a digital option to withdraw central bank money while a bank run was in progress, if not managed very carefully, could have contributed to the crisis itself.
This is admittedly an extreme and very specific example, but not a unique one. Earlier on, similar “rescue flights” full of banknotes, for much bigger amounts, had to be arranged to manage the banking crisis in Greece.9 As in the case of Cyprus the Greek example illustrates the possible conflicting effect that a retail central bank digital money can have. It may help manage an ongoing banking crisis, but can also contribute to triggering one if handled improperly. A risk that can be contained only through regulation strictly limiting the availability of retail CBDCs in normal times.
In conclusion, while future payment systems are unlikely to be shaped by CBDCs, a reasonable case can be made that having in place digital payment infrastructures at the central bank, potentially accessible by a very large user base, may help overcome adverse contingencies. The related operational and legal infrastructures require a long preparatory phase. Preparing in advance can therefore be useful, even though the eventual use may appear uncertain or even unlikely.
From today’s perspective, the best advice one can give to the ECB, and to other central banks, is therefore: Continue to prepare, otherwise wait and see.
1. ↑ Christopher Waller, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “CBDCs: a solution in search of a problem?”; speech at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, 5 August 2021. The text is available here.
2. ↑ In the ancient Greek theater, a deus-ex-machina (Latin expression translated from Greek) was a godly intervention that managed to solve a complicated situation that humans had gotten into and were unable to solve.
3. ↑ This paper builds on and develops further the line of argument put forth in two recent contributions: Ignazio Angeloni, “Digital euro: when in doubt, abstain (but be prepared)”, April 2023, paper prepared for the European Parliament, available here; and Ignazio Angeloni, “Digital euro: what we know and what we don’t”, keynote address at the OMFIF Symposium on Central Bank Digital Currencies held in London on 9 May 2023, available here.
4. ↑ Cash-to-GDP ratios have been declining in recent decades in Norway and Sweden.
5. ↑ See the recent report of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Options for deposit insurance reform”, available here, where alternative options for extending the coverage of deposit insurance are presented to deal with that risk.
6. ↑ Bank for International Settlements, Annual Economic Report 2022, chapter III, “The Future Monetary System”; available here. See also a related presentation given on 30 June 2022 by Hyun Song Shin, Economic Adviser and Head of Research of the Bank for International Settlements, available here.
7. ↑ For an authoritative and compelling account of the Cyprus crisis, see P. Demetriades, A Diary of the Euro Crisis in Cyprus, Palgrave Macmillan; 2017.
8. ↑ The episode was reported by multiple press sources; see for example the Huffington Post, “Cyprus Bailout: One Million Euros Heading To Island For British Military Personnel”, available here.
9. ↑ See for example Reuter News, “Cash airlift helped avert bank run during debt crisis”, 3 March 2013, available here.
The digital euro: what we know and what we don’t
OMFIF
A new digital currency would have to be ‘very innovative’ to compete
The European Central Bank is preparing for a possible digital euro. This would be a liability of the bank, like paper currency and deposits. However, with digital currencies in high supply in a saturated market and traditional payment methods remaining popular, the ECB needs to assess if launching the digital euro is worth the effort.
Deposits at the ECB have grown enormously as a result of quantitative easing and now stand at €4tn. In the 21 years of their existence, euro banknotes have increased seven times in value – up to €1.6tn – amounting to a compounded annual increase of about 10%. The corresponding figure for the dollar is 6.5%, while sterling is 5.2% and the Swiss franc is 4.4%.
Some argue that the popularity of cash is due to growing illegal activities, but this is unlikely to explain the phenomenon. Until now, the increase of the euro in circulation has been very steady; indicators of criminal activity do not have such a smooth profile. And the increase in euro coins shows more or less the same pattern. Criminals and tax evaders are unlikely to make extensive use of coins.
It seems that people actually like holding euro banknotes, despite the fact that, for many retail purposes, they are being replaced by more convenient digital means – online platforms, payment cards and smartphone applications. This preference has implications for the digital euro.
Accounts for the digital euro will be offered mainly by banks and all front-end functions will be carried out by them. Importantly, the digital euro will look very much like a bank deposit and banks will be responsible for onboarding and offboarding, know your customer and anti-money laundering checks, as well as providing all services normally associated with deposits – online banking, payment cards and apps. From a user perspective, there will be no difference between making a digital euro deposit or making a deposit at a bank as they will include the same processes, require the same information and provide the same forms to fill out.
The introduction of a digital euro would most likely result in a move away from bank deposits, rather than from paper currency. Banknotes have unique characteristics – simplicity, absolute privacy and tangibility – that are highly valued, which the digital euro will never have. However, substitution between digital euros and deposits entails complications and concerns for the conduct of monetary policy and for financial stability.
The digital euro would magnify the risk of bank runs because it would offer a risk-free online alternative to bank deposits. In the euro area, this risk is compounded by the incompleteness of the banking union, specifically the lack of area-wide deposit insurance.
However, the main unknown of the project is the reception by the market – already saturated with digital payment systems. To compete with powerful incumbents like Apple Pay or Google Pay, or even smaller but efficient service providers like Revolut, the new entrant would have to be very innovative. This is not likely to be the case for the digital euro. Failure to market it successfully would have negative reputational and cost implications for the ECB.
The private digital payments sector has been quite efficient over the last 20 years. It is hard to identify market failures that justify public intervention. The arguments in favour of a digital euro today are not strong enough to justify the launch of the currency. However, this decision will not made for several years at least, which means there is plenty of room for unknowns in the meantime.
We could witness, for example, a collapse in the use of banknotes, which current digital payment providers and their infrastructures cannot handle with the available technologies. Or we could experience financial instability, requiring the ECB to step in to preserve the functionality of the payments system. Or there could be strategic security conditions requiring more state-controlled monetary and payment infrastructures.
Fortunately, these are very unlikely scenarios, but not impossible ones, which may call for central banks to step in, perhaps within a short time. The best advice one can give to the ECB, and to other central banks, is: continue to prepare, otherwise, wait and see.
This article is based on a keynote address given at OMFIF’s Digital Monetary Institute symposium in London on 9 May 2023. Read the full speech here.
© Copyright
Letter: Banknotes have characteristics a digital euro can never acquire
Financial Times –
with Daniel Gros
Eswar Prasad argues that the advent of central bank digital currencies are inevitable (“Central banks bow to the inevitability of digital currencies”, Opinion, May 4). The reason given is cash is less used in daily transactions.
But cash is not disappearing; actually it is booming almost everywhere. In the 21 years of the single currency’s existence, euro banknotes in circulation have increased sevenfold and currently stand at close to €1.6tn, growing at a compound rate of around 10 per cent. The comparable figure for the US dollar is 6.5 per cent, and the British pound 5.2 per cent. Euro coins show, in proportion, a similar profile. Criminals and tax evaders are unlikely to make extensive use of coins.
CBDCs would primarily replace bank deposits, not paper currency. Banknotes have unique characteristics that the digital euro will never have.
The CBDCs launched by China and the Bahamas have been flops. Prasad recognised this but reverses the argument: if there is no demand, he says, let’s see what central banks can do to make it attractive. But that’s a strange way of proposing public intervention to correct a market failure that does not exist. Besides, this would be a lost battle. Central banks cannot be as innovative as market providers. Combining this with a central bank’s role in payment oversight would also create conflicts of interest.
European legislators may be tempted to make acceptance and distribution of CBDCs mandatory. But not even such a dirigiste approach would guarantee success. Surveys show that people do not appreciate the difference between a CBDC and a bank deposit (insured in the EU up to €100,000).
CBDCs could be needed in extreme scenarios. But such remote contingencies are an argument for being prepared, not for launching the instrument without due consideration.
© Copyright
The Bank of England 25 Years on: Comparisons from across the Channel
Written evidence for the House of Lords inquiry on the Bank of England: Has independence worked?
This note contains reflections on the experience of the European Central Bank in the last quarter-century, in light of the questions posed by the House of Lords for the review of the Bank of England in the same period. It covers the following aspects: a comparison of performance; measures of independence; comparing statutes and their enduring relevance; the role of the secondary objectives; relations with the Treasury; diversity, expertise, and independence in the decision-making bodies; and external communication.
L’inflazione è una droga: lezione che ancora oggi viene da Weimar
Il Sole 24 Ore
Cent’anni: un secolo. Nel linguaggio comune, l’eternità per antonomasia. Un secolo basta per cancellare una civiltà, rendere irriconoscibili città e nazioni, estinguere, salvo pochissime eccezioni, tutti gli abitanti della terra. Ma non è bastato a rimuovere dalla sensibilità profonda del popolo tedesco il segno di quella che rimane una delle esperienze più traumatiche della sua storia: l’iperinflazione della repubblica di Weimar, del cui culmine ricorre quest’anno il centenario. Ne troviamo traccia in alcuni tratti tipici della tedesca: l’avversione a volte ossessiva per ciò che cambia, visto come foriero di instabilità; la frugalità sentita come porto sicuro nelle avversità. Vale ancora quello che Costantino Bresciani Turroni, economista e rappresentante italiano nella commissione per le riparazioni di guerra, scriveva nel 1931: «Si comprende facilmente la ragione per cui l’esperienza dei tristi anni 1919-23 pesa sempre come un incubo sul popolo tedesco».mens
La giovane repubblica era appena emersa dalla guerra perduta in cui l’avevano condotta la combinazione del militarismo prussiano (di cui offre un crudo ritratto il film Niente di nuovo sul fronte occidentale, trasposizione del capolavoro di Remarque premiata con quattro Oscar questo’anno) e le sconclusionate mire imperialistiche dell’Austria-Ungheria: uno stato senza identità unitaria, un uovo con due tuorli, come ha scritto Cristopher Clark nel suo magistrale saggio sulle origini della grande guerra (I Sonnambuli; Laterza, 2013).
Dopo il ritorno dei combattenti dai campi di battaglia e il fallimento della rivoluzione comunista di Klaus Liebknecht e Rosa Luxembourg, uccisi nel 1919 dalle famigerate Freikorps, squadre paramilitari poi confluite nelle SA di Hitler, la giovane repubblica aveva la possibilità di trovare una sua età dell’oro. Libertà politica e artistica fiorivano a dispetto degli stenti: Kandinski e Ernst nella pittura, Brecht e i Mann nella letteratura, Gropius nell’architettura, i fisici Heisenberg e Born, fra molti altri, esprimevano una vivacità intellettuale europea che il nazismo avrebbe estirpato o fatto emigrare per sempre.
Come in ogni conflitto, l’economia di guerra aveva creato inflazione. Ma era un fenomeno limitato, che poteva essere fermato. Bresciani Turroni dimostra con dati e argomenti (Le vicende del marco tedesco, Egea SpA, 1931) che dopo l’armistizio del novembre 1918 e prima che il trattato di Versailles (1919) e l’ultimatum di Londra (1921) imponessero alla Germania le gravose riparazioni di guerra che John Maynard Keynes avrebbe stigmatizzato ne Le conseguenze economiche della pace, i semi del disastro monetario venivano già posti internamente. Alla loro origine erano vari fattori: inerzia e debolezza dei governanti, alimentate dalla situazione sociale e dai timori di rivoluzione comunista al nord e fascista in Baviera; interessi di gruppi industriali e di speculatori che nell’inflazione si arricchivano sul cambio e sulle derrate alimentari; soprattutto, la nefasta influenza di idee economiche errate. Sono queste ultime che più ci riguardano oggi, perché quell’influenza può ripetersi. Certo, l’inflazione di Weimar è un evento unico, con caratteristiche irripetibili. Ma come un laboratorio in cui condizioni estreme aiutano a capire l’essenza della materia, essa contiene in nuce elementi di tutte le inflazioni di tutti i tempi.
La classe politica di Weimar e la sua banca centrale, la Reichsbank (il cui governatore Rudolf Havenstein come per una nemesi da tragedia greca sarebbe morto proprio il giorno della stabilizzazione del marco), erano in quegli anni prigionieri di due idee, tanto errate quanto in apparenza incontrovertibili. Vale la pena di capirle, in ossequio al detto «se le conosci le eviti».
La prima è la cosiddetta teoria delle cambiali commerciali, o real bills doctrine. Essa sostiene che quando la creazione di moneta ha a fronte attività produttive, essa non porta inflazione perché alla creazione di mezzi di pagamento corrisponde un’equivalente creazione di beni. È facile comprendere il fascino che una teoria del genere esercitava su industriali e speculatori intereressati a perpetuare il finanziamento delle loro attività a dispetto dell’inflazione galoppante. La “dottrina” è errata per il semplice fatto che essa non pone alcun limite all’offerta di moneta e al livello dei prezzi.
Ma neppure essa avrebbe procurato soverchi danni se non si fosse combinata con un’altra idea che anni dopo l’economista americano James Tobin avrebbe confutato, chiamandola «post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc».
La teoria, cioè, secondo cui fra due eventi economici temporalmente successivi l’uno all’altro debba necessariamente esistere un rapporto di causa diretto. Può accadere invece che il rapporto sia inverso, e sia l’evento successivo a causare quello precedente.
Durante la guerra, con un’inflazione limitata, adeguamenti del valore del marco rispetto al dollaro o alla sterlina tendevano a seguire variazioni del suo valore interno (rispetto ai beni di consumo). Nel dopoguerra inizia ad accadere l’opposto: è la svalutazione del cambio del marco che spesso anticipa, e addirittura eccede, l’aumento dei prezzi interni, e ancor più quello dei redditi da lavoro, con conseguente deprezzamento reale del cambio e impoverimento delle classi medie. Nella confusione che l’inflazione genera, l’unico riferimento oggettivo per chi fissa i prezzi è la quotazione del marco nelle borse di Londra e New York. Il grande errore dei politici del tempo e della banca centrale fu ritenere che fosse il cambio a causare i prezzi, anziché l’opposto, e che da questo seguisse un aumento della domanda di mezzi monetari che la banca centrale doveva per forza soddisfare per evitare il tracollo dell’economia (oggi si chiamerebbe “recessione”). Siccome sulla quotazione del marco pesavano anche le riparazioni di guerra, era facile, e anche politicamente attraente, concludere che erano le potenze vincitrici a causare l’inflazione in Germania con le loro condizioni capestro.
Poteva la Germania sopportare le riparazioni imposte a Versailles ed evitare al tempo stesso il disastro economico? Keynes lo ha negato, colla sua abituale forza retorica e preveggenza. In un saggio recente, lo storico italiano Alessandro Roselli (Hyperinflation, depression, and the rise of Adolf Hitler; Economic Affairs, 2021) sembra propendere per la tesi opposta. Comunque sia, ancora nell’agosto del 1923, a tre mesi dalla stabilizzazione del marco e dalla sua stessa morte per infarto, Havenstein, mentre i prezzi salivano di venti volte in un solo mese, ribadiva che l’inflazione originava dall’estero (oggi si chiamerebbe «inflazione importata», o «shock da offerta») e che la banca centrale doveva accomodarla. Parole che colpiscono a un secolo di distanza. Così come colpisce, pur nella diversità delle situazioni, la similitudine con quelle usate dal governatore della Banca d’Italia Guido Carli nel 1974 per giustificare l’accomodamento monetario alla crisi petrolifera.
Nel dramma del popolo tedesco in quel momento si erge la figura di Hjalmar Schacht, a buon titolo ritenuto uno dei più grandi banchieri centrali della storia, la cui reputazione non è stata compromessa neanche dalla successiva parziale acquiescenza al nazismo. Nominato dal neo cancelliere Gustav Stresemann «commissario per la moneta», ovvero di fatto sostituto del governatore, relegato in un ufficio provvisorio, un sottoscala prima usato come armadio delle scope, Schacht sa che solo un’azione decisa, con impatto psicologico immediato e risolutivo può fermare insieme inflazione e svalutazione e salvare l’economia. Attende il 20 novembre, quando il valore del marco tocca una frazione precisa: un milionesimo di milionesimo del valore aureo anteguerra. A quel punto istantaneamente taglia dodici zeri e annuncia che la banca centrale, di cui diventerà ufficialmente presidente dopo la morte del povero Havenstein, non finanzierà più il governo. Il vecchio marco-carta vale ora mille miliardesimi della nuova valuta, il marco-rendita, la cui offerta viene attentamente razionata; a buon conto, la convertibilità sarà consentita solo l’anno dopo, a riforma riuscita. L’effetto è miracoloso: prezzi e cambio si fermano; il bilancio pubblico, prima penalizzato dall’inflazione, torna in pareggio; i generi alimentari introvabili ricompaiono sui banchi dei negozi. La Germania ritrova un relativo benessere che sarebbe durato anni, fino a che la Grande Depressione non avrebbe portato al nazismo.
Oggi, mentre le vicende di cui sopra continuano a turbare i sonni fra il Reno e l’Oder, non è inutile ripassare le lezioni che se ne traggono. L’inflazione ha sempre molte cause – una guerra, una variazione dei prezzi importati, o, recentemente, una crisi sanitaria. È raro, se non impossibile, che essa si sviluppi e duri senza condizioni monetarie permissive. Mentre essa prende piede, sarà sempre difficile distinguerne le cause, nella sequenza confusa di eventi ognuno dei quali può essere interpretato come conseguenza di un altro. Esisteranno sempre plausibili ragioni e consiglieri più o meno interessati che suggeriscono alla banca centrale di procrastinare le azioni di contrasto. Alla fine, però, non vi sono alternative alla politica monetaria per arrestarla.
Come ha scritto Lord D’Abernon, ambasciatore inglese a Berlino dal 1920 al 1925, critico implacabile dei governanti tedeschi e fonte di molte delle nostre conoscenze su quel periodo: «In un modo o nell’altro l’inflazione è una droga. Alla fine è fatale, ma prima aiuta i suoi elettori a superare tanti momenti difficili».
Digital Euro: When in doubt, abstain (but be prepared)
Prepared for the European Parliament Economic and Financial Affairs Committee
In-Depth Analysis
Prepared for the European Parliament Economic and Financial Affairs Committee
This paper assesses the state of preparation for the possible launch of a digital euro. It focuses on the main relevant aspects: market impact, implications for banks, design and technical issues, monetary policy, financial stability, the role of fintech and Big Techs, international dimensions, privacy, and financial inclusion. On each, brief recommendations for the ECON Committee’s work are offered. The concluding judgment is broadly positive on the preparatory work but doubtful on the wisdom of eventually launching a digital euro.
Da SVB a Deutsche Bank: il nuovo dna della crisi
Class CNBC
Interview in the podcast “The week that was in Europe”
Natixis CIB
Every Friday, Klaus Adam, Professor of Economics, University of Oxford & Mannheim, and Dirk Schumacher, Head of European Macro Research at Natixis recap what has happened during the week across Europe and add some deeper analysis on the current hot topics.
Also available on Apple Podcasts >> and Spotify >>
Ignazio Angeloni 